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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO : Case No. 20040965-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. VIOLATIONS OF THE "KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" RULE 
CONSTITUTE A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the "common law 'knock and 
announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth 
Amendment." Wilson v. Arkansas. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). This holding clarifies that 
violations of the "knock and announce" rule constitute a fundamental violation of the 
Fourth Amendment requiring suppression where factors do not make it reasonable, just as 
with other types of Fourth Amendment violations. 
In State v. Ribe, this Court "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule" that the "knock and 
announce" statute requires suppression "in light of the Utah Supreme Court's dictates on 
the subject... in the context of police violations of 'rule[s] of criminal procedure.'" 876 
P.2d 403, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, in Wilson, the U.S. Supreme court made 
clear that a violation of the "knock and announce" rule is more than a violation of a rule 
of criminal procedure but "a principle [that] is an element of the reasonableness inquiry 
under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. 
Therefore, the question no longer is whether a violation of the "knock and 
announce" rule is fundamental just like other violations of the Fourth Amendment to 
which there are exceptions but, instead, whether the circumstances surrounding a 
violation of the "knock and announce" rule requires suppression under the totality of the 
circumstances. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (applying the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether exceptions to the knock and announce rule 
justifies its violation); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (holding that trial 
court must determine under the totality of the circumstances whether exceptions justified 
officers "no knock" entry); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 936 (holding that "although a 
search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers 
enter without prior announcement," under the totality of the circumstances officers entry 
may be reasonable under an exception to the rule); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992) (listing recognized exceptions justifying warrantless searches where 
suppression not required). 
In this case, the officers violated the "knock and announce" rule by forcing entry 
into the residence without waiting a reasonable time, and absent exigent circumstances. 
In doing so, they violated Mr. Armijo's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable 
2 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. This fundamental violation required the trial 
court to grant Mr. Armijo's motion to suppress the evidence. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY AND UTAH CODE 
ANN. $ 77-23-212 ARGUMENTS DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL BECAUSE 
THEY WERE NOT RAISED BELOW, ARE NOT APPARENT ON THE 
RECORD AND ARE NOT SUSTAINABLE BY THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
The State argues (1) the officers would have inevitably discovered the drugs in Mr. 
Armijo's possession "regardless of the number of seconds the officers waited on the 
doorstep" and (2) suppression is not justified under Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212. 
Appellee. Br. at 26-28, 32. However, the State's alternative grounds for affirmance are 
prohibited under State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159, because they are not 
apparent on the trial court record and not sustainable by the court's factual findings. Id. at 
19. 
First, the State seems to be arguing that had the officers followed the law, then the 
drugs in Mr. Armijo's possession would have been discovered. However, the Supreme 
Court has already rejected such a rationale by the state in Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at 1J19. 
In Topanotes, the Supreme Court criticized the state for its "if we hadn't done it wrong, 
we would have done it right" argument, as one that was "far from compelling." Id. The 
court reasoned that there must be something supporting the "inevitable discovery 'to 
prevent the inevitable discovery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule.'" Id, 
Next, the state argues that even though "section 77-23-212 was not argued in the district 
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court" it is an alternative ground on which this court can affirm. However, the state does 
not offer any evidence that its theory "is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record." Id. at ^ 9. 
If the inevitable discovery doctrine or alternative ground for affirmance theory was 
not raised before or relied on by the trial court, an appellate court can still apply it to 
affirm a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's motion to suppress. See id. at f9 
(holding "appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on 
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory 
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action" (citations 
omitted)). "However, not only must the alternative ground be apparent on the record, it 
must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court." Id "'[T]he court of 
appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to 
sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate ground.'" Id. (citations omitted). In 
Topanotes, the Supreme Court determined that 
[There was no] authority for the proposition that the State, after having had 
one opportunity to establish the admissibility of evidence in the face of a 
Fourth Amendment challenge, is entitled to a remand to put on new 
evidence under a new theory of admissibility. In fact, we have previously 
held that when the State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal 
fails to sustain any theory of admissibility, the State "is not entitled to a 
remand to put on new evidence." 
Id at f 11 (citations omitted) 
The inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and 
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circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the 
police would have discovered the evidence despite the illegality."1 Id. at ^ [14. However, 
it only applies '"[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.5" 
Id (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (other citation omitted). "A 
crucial element of inevitable discovery is independence; there must be some 'independent 
basis for discovery,9 fUnited States v. Boatwright 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987)], and 
'the investigation that inevitably would have led to the evidence [must] be independent of 
the constitutional violation, [United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984,987 (10th Cir. 
1997)]/" Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^ [16 (second alteration in original). "Thus, 'the fact 
or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable [must] arise from circumstances other 
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864-65). 
In this case, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress should not be 
affirmed under the inevitable discovery doctrine or under the state's section 77-23-212 
theory. The State did not argue either of these theories below and the trial court did not 
rely on either of them in its ruling. R. 121; 202; 203. Accordingly, the inevitable 
1
 The "independent source doctrine describes one method of satisfying the inevitable 
discovery exception, which is to demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal 
police activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent, prior investigation." 
State v.James, 2000 UT 80, Tfl5,13 P.3d 576. 
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discovery doctrine and the state's section 77-23-212 argument are only available as an 
alternative grounds of affirmance and must be sustainable by the factual findings of the 
trial court. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^ [9. However, in its ruling, the trial court made 
no findings that had the officers waited a reasonable time the drugs in Mr. Armijo's 
possession would have inevitably been discovered or that despite the officer's unlawful 
search it still cannot be suppressed because under section 77-23-212 the unlawful conduct 
was not substantial. R. 121-123. 
Because the state failed to present evidence under either of these two theories, they 
are not alternative grounds for affirmance supported or sustained by the record or factual 
findings. Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the evidence should have been 
suppressed. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^ [11 (holding State's failure to meet 
preponderance of evidence requirement of inevitable discovery doctrine required reversal 
because when "State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal fails to sustain any 
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence'"). 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth more fully in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Armijo respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse 
his conviction. 
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